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google 1 0 149 74 223 30
facebook 3 1 101 66 168 0
apple 58 1 67 86 155 0
icloud 368 1 28 69 98 0
amazon 10 2 69 27 98 32
bittrex 386 2 18 76 96 1
blockchain 884 2 40 32 74 0
instagram 17 7 25 28 60 0
yahoo 6 0 43 13 56 31
twitter 13 4 32 19 55 5
paypal 61 0 23 28 51 3
youtube 2 0 22 23 45 0
hotels 748 0 9 35 44 0
whatsapp 69 0 33 3 36 0
coinbase 357 2 8 23 33 0
skype 345 0 18 14 32 30
microsoft 47 1 17 10 28 0
wikipedia 5 1 24 3 28 0
steamcommunity 169 1 8 18 27 0
linkedin 30 2 11 9 22 0
?? 115 (5.3%) 1,118 (51.1%) 955 (43.6%) 2,188 166 (7.6%)
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paypal 61 0 4 2 6
apple 50 0 4 0 4
facebook 3 0 2 1 3
icloud 368 0 2 1 3
google 1 0 2 0 2
steamcommunity 169 0 0 2 2
elpais 405 0 1 0 1
?? 0 (0.0%) 15 (71.4%) 6 (28.6%) 21
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